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May 4, 2018 201491253

Commonwealth of Kentucky 

Workers’ Compensation Board

 

 

 

OPINION ENTERED:  May 4, 2018

 

 

CLAIM NO. 201491253

 

 

HEATHER MORGAN                                 PETITIONER

 

 

 

VS.       APPEAL FROM HON. JONATHAN R. WEATHERBY,

                 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

 

 

 

BLUEGRASS OAKWOOD INC.

and HON. JONATHAN R. WEATHERBY,

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE                      RESPONDENTS

 

 

OPINION

VACATING IN PART AND REMANDING

                       * * * * * *

 

 

BEFORE:  ALVEY, Chairman, STIVERS and RECHTER, Members. 

 

STIVERS, Member. Heather Morgan (“Morgan”) seeks review of the November 17, 2017, Opinion and Award of Hon. Jonathan R. Weatherby, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) finding she sustained a work-related cervical injury generating a 28% impairment rating while in the employ of Bluegrass Oakwood Inc. (“Bluegrass Oakwood”). The ALJ awarded temporary total disability (“TTD”) and permanent partial disability (“PPD”) benefits enhanced by the two multiplier contained in KRS 342.730(1)(c)2 and medical benefits. Morgan also appeals from the January 9, 2018, Order amending the opinion and award to correct the date of Morgan’s second injury as stipulated by the parties but denying the remainder of her petition for reconsideration. In doing so, the ALJ affirmed the enhancement of Morgan’s PPD benefits by the two multiplier.

          On appeal, Morgan challenges the ALJ’s decision on two grounds. First, Morgan asserts the ALJ erred by failing to enhance the award by the three multiplier set forth in KRS 342.730(1)(c)1. Morgan notes that, in four separate paragraphs within the findings of fact, the ALJ found she did not retain the ability to return to the same type of work she performed at the time of the injury. Thus, Morgan is entitled to the three multiplier. Instead, the ALJ chose to apply the two multiplier since he also found Morgan returned to work at the same or greater wages and ultimately had to stop due to her work injuries. Morgan notes she filed a petition for reconsideration addressing the issue of the multipliers which the ALJ overruled stating:

There is no credible evidence of any additional impairment suffered or of more significant restrictions issued that would constitute any change in her condition such that the ‘3’ multiplier could be justified. 

          Morgan argues the ALJ’s order is at best confusing since it directly contradicts his finding Morgan did not retain the ability to return to the same type of work. Morgan argues the ALJ failed to explain why the two multiplier is appropriate. This is further complicated by his statement there was no credible evidence to support the application of the three multiplier. Morgan requests the claim be remanded to the ALJ for enhancement of her award by the three multiplier. Alternatively, Morgan requests remand with instructions to conduct an analysis pursuant to Fawbush v. Gwinn, 102 S.W.3d 5 (Ky. 2003) and in accordance with the Kentucky Supreme Court’s directive in Adams v. NHC Healthcare, 199 S.W.3d 163 (Ky. 2006).

          Next, Morgan asserts the ALJ failed to adequately address her entitlement to additional TTD benefits. Morgan notes the ALJ determined she was entitled to two periods of TTD benefits in addition to those already paid but failed to address her entitlement to two other periods of TTD benefits. Morgan claims she is entitled to TTD benefits from June 17, 2014, through July 31, 2014, and from June 14, 2015, through September 30, 2015.

          Morgan notes entitlement to TTD benefits was listed as a contested issue in the September 18, 2017, Benefit Review Conference Order & Memorandum (“BRC Order”). She also notes her petition for reconsideration raised as an issue the ALJ’s failure to address her entitlement to TTD benefits during these two periods. However, in the January 9, 2018, Order, the ALJ failed to address her request for an award of TTD benefits during the periods in question, including the weekly TTD benefit rate to be paid.

          In her Form 101, Morgan alleged a February 17, 2014, injury to her neck when she was struck on the side of her neck by a resident of Bluegrass Oakwood.

          By agreement of the parties, the claim was bifurcated for the ALJ to decide the sole issue of Morgan’s entitlement to C6-7 artificial disk placement surgery. In an August 24, 2015, Interlocutory Opinion and Order, relying upon the opinions of Dr. Magdy El-Kalliny, the ALJ concluded the proposed surgery was reasonable, necessary, and causally work-related. Consequently, Bluegrass Oakwood was directed to immediately pre-authorize payment for the recommended surgery and was responsible for all medical expenses related to the treatment of the work-related cervical spine injury. The claim was placed in abeyance pending maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) and Bluegrass Oakwood was to institute payment of TTD benefits commencing from the date of the surgery until Morgan attained MMI.

          Thereafter, Morgan successfully amended her Form 101 to include a claim for injuries to the cervical region on June 14, 2015, and April 19, 2016.

          The BRC Order reflects the parties stipulated Morgan sustained work-related injuries on February 17, 2014, July 15, 2016, and April 19, 2016. The contested issues were: benefits per KRS 342.730 and TTD.   

          In the November 17, 2017, Opinion and Award, relying upon the opinion of Dr. El-Kalliny, the ALJ found Morgan retained a 28% impairment rating as a result of the February 17, 2014, work-injury.[1] As noted by Morgan, in paragraphs 10, 14, 15, and 16 within the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the ALJ found Morgan did not retain the ability to return to the same type of work. However, in paragraph 16, in addition to finding Morgan did not retain the ability to return to the same type of work, the ALJ also found as follows:      

The ALJ finds that the Plaintiff, despite not retaining the ability to return to the same type of work, did return at the same or greater wages and then ultimately had to stop due to the work injuries suffered herein. The ALJ therefore finds that the “2” multiplier applies per KRS 342.730(1)(c)2.

          With respect to Morgan’s entitlement to TTD benefits beyond those previously paid by Bluegrass Oakwood, the ALJ concluded Morgan reached MMI as of January 11, 2015, and she was entitled to additional TTD benefits during the periods from April 20, 2016, through April 26, 2016, and from August 31, 2016, through January 11, 2017.[2]

          Morgan filed a petition for reconsideration asserting, in relevant part, the ALJ had concluded in four different paragraphs that she did not retain the ability to return to the same type of work. However, the ALJ failed to award the three multiplier, and instead, chose to enhance Morgan’s benefits by the two multiplier. Morgan contended the fact the ALJ found she returned to work at the same or greater wages following the first two injuries did not dispose of the issue of whether she is entitled to enhanced benefits by the two multiplier or the three multiplier. Thus, Morgan contended the award should be enhanced by the three multiplier. Alternatively, Morgan requested “additional Findings of Fact and/or Conclusions of Law regarding the application of the three (3) multiplier versus the two (2) multiplier” pursuant to Fawbush.

          Concerning the award of TTD benefits, Morgan noted the parties stipulated TTD benefits had been paid during three different periods. Morgan pointed out that in addition to the periods of TTD benefits awarded by the ALJ in his decision, she had sought TTD benefits during the periods from June 17, 2014, through July 31, 2014, and from June 14, 2015, through September 30, 2015. Morgan requested the ALJ award TTD benefits for the previous periods paid as well as the additional periods cited within her petition for reconsideration. Morgan also requested the ALJ correct the weekly TTD benefit rate.

          In the January 9, 2018, Order, the ALJ amended the opinion and award to reflect the second date of injury was June 14, 2015. However, with regard to Morgan’s claim of entitlement to the three multiplier or her request for a Fawbush analysis, the ALJ stated as follows:

After an additional review of the evidence, the facts found to be credible by the ALJ support the award of the "2" multiplier. The ALJ specifically finds that the Plaintiff's credible testimony supports the issuance of the "2" multiplier.

The Plaintiff testified that she returned at the same wages but had to stop working due to the residual effects of her prior injuries. There is no credible evidence of any additional impairment suffered or of more significant restrictions issued that would constitute any change in her condition such that the "3" multiplier could be justified.

          Significantly, the ALJ did not address Morgan’s request for resolution of her claim for TTD benefits for the periods in question and resolve the issue of the TTD benefit rate.

          Finding the ALJ erred in not conducting a Fawbush analysis and in failing to resolve Morgan’s entitlement to the two periods of TTD benefits which she sought in her brief to the ALJ and the petition for reconsideration, we vacate the enhancement of the award by the two multiplier and the award of TTD benefits.

          Unquestionably, the ALJ found the three multiplier was applicable. The ALJ further found Morgan had returned to work earning the same or greater wages, thus causing the two multiplier to be applicable. Consequently, an analysis pursuant to Fawbush is mandated. In Fawbush, the Kentucky Supreme Court directed when the two multiplier and the three multiplier are found to be applicable to a claim, the ALJ “is authorized to determine which provision is more appropriate on the facts.” Id. at 12. The Supreme Court further instructed if the evidence indicates, “a worker is unlikely to be able to continue earning a wage that equals or exceeds the wage at the time of the injury for the indefinite future application of paragraph (c)1 is appropriate.” Id. As a result, in the case sub judice, the ALJ was required to determine which multiplier is more appropriate based on the facts.

          In Adams, the Supreme Court addressed the range of factors to be considered in conducting a Fawbush analysis, stating: 

The court explained subsequently in Adkins v. Pike County Board of Education, 141 S.W.3d 387 (Ky. App. 2004), that the Fawbush analysis includes a broad range of factors, only one of which is the ability to perform the current job. The standard for the decision is whether the injury has permanently altered the worker's ability to earn an income. The application of KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 is appropriate if an individual returns to work at the same or a greater wage but is unlikely to be able to continue for the indefinite future to do work from which to earn such a wage.

Id. at 168-169.

          In the case sub judice, the ALJ failed to determine, pursuant to Fawbush, whether Morgan is unlikely to be able to continue earning a wage that equals the wage at the time of the injury for the indefinite future based on the factors set forth in Adams. Thus, enhancement of the award by the two multiplier must be vacated.

          Similarly, the ALJ erred in not addressing in his decision and in the January 9, 2018, Order all of Morgan’s claim for additional TTD benefits. In her brief to the ALJ, Morgan noted TTD benefits were paid from February 18, 2014, through June 16, 2014, and benefits were terminated based on Dr. Richard Sheridan’s opinion who performed an examination on July 1, 2014. However, Morgan came under the care of Dr. El-Kalliny who saw her on July 2, 2014. Dr. El-Kalliny took her off work that day and directed she remain off work until September 2, 2014. Dr. El-Kalliny subsequently released Morgan to return to work as of July 31, 2014. Morgan sought TTD benefits from June 17, 2014, through July 31, 2014, the day before she returned to work.

          Morgan also argued she continued to work until her second injury on June 14, 2015, at which time she was again taken off work with no payment of TTD benefits. Morgan noted the ALJ issued an interlocutory opinion awarding TTD benefits from the date of surgery on October 1, 2015, until she attained MMI. Morgan submitted there was a gap during which TTD benefits were not paid following the second injury from June 14, 2015, through September 30, 2015, and she was entitled to benefits during this period.

          Morgan further asserted there was a gap in the payment of TTD benefits from April 20, 2016, through April 26, 2016, and from April 31, 2016, through January 11, 2017. In the decision, the ALJ awarded TTD benefits for the last two periods Morgan sought TTD benefits but failed to address the first two periods for which Morgan claimed she was entitled to TTD benefits. Morgan timely raised this issue in her petition for reconsideration, and the ALJ failed to resolve it. The ALJ also failed to address the weekly TTD benefit rate as requested by Morgan. Therefore, the award of TTD benefits must be vacated. On remand, the ALJ must address Morgan’s entitlement to TTD benefits during the periods in question, which includes the weekly TTD benefit rate.

          Accordingly, the award of income benefits enhancing Morgan’s benefits by the two multiplier is VACATED. The award of TTD benefits is also VACATED. This claim is REMANDED to the ALJ to conduct a Fawbush analysis and a determination as to whether it is more appropriate to enhance the award of PPD benefits by the two multiplier or three multiplier. The ALJ shall also enter an amended decision resolving Morgan’s claim of entitlement to TTD benefits from June 17, 2014, through July 30, 2014, and from June 14, 2015, through September 30, 2015. This includes resolution of the weekly TTD benefit rate to which Morgan is entitled.

          ALL CONCUR.

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER:

HON MARK D KNIGHT

P O BOX 49

SOMERSET KY 42502

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT:

HON ROBERT FERRERI

614 W MAIN ST STE 5500

LOUISVILLE KY 40202

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:

HON JONATHAN R WEATHERBY

657 CHAMBERLIN AVE

FRANKFORT KY 40601

 

 

 

 

 



[1] Neither party disputes the ALJ’s finding that the impairment rating is solely attributable to the first injury.

[2] The ALJ did not find Morgan was entitled to an award of TTD benefits during the periods the parties stipulated TTD benefits were paid to Morgan. Apparently, the ALJ’s reference to TTD benefits already awarded is those TTD benefits voluntarily paid as stipulated by the parties.