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January 15, 2016 201285818

Commonwealth of Kentucky 

Workers’ Compensation Board

 

 

 

OPINION ENTERED:  June 16, 2017

 

 

CLAIM NO. 201200502

 

 

RANDY WEAVER                                  PETITIONER

 

 

 

VS.        APPEAL FROM HON. JONATHAN WEATHERBY,

                 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

 

 

 

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC

AND HON. JONATHAN WEATHERBY,

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE                      RESPONDENTS

 

 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

 

 

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BEFORE:  ALVEY, Chairman, STIVERS and RECHTER, Members. 

 

 

RECHTER, Member.  Randy Weaver (“Weaver”) appeals from the November 21, 2016 Opinion and Order and the January 19, 2017 Order rendered by Hon. Jonathan R. Weatherby, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) resolving a medical dispute in favor of United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”).  On appeal, Weaver argues the ALJ erred in finding the disputed medical treatment was unreasonable and unnecessary.  We affirm.

          Weaver, a pilot for UPS, developed a respiratory condition from exposure to volcanic ash while flying over Sweden on April 23, 2010.  In an Opinion and Order dated March 27, 2015, he was awarded permanent partial disability benefits based upon a 25% impairment rating enhanced by the three multiplier.  UPS filed a motion to reopen and medical dispute on May 6, 2016 to challenge the reasonableness and necessity of Dr. Swapna Chandran’s referral to National Jewish Health in Denver, Colorado. 

          In an August 8, 2016 letter, Dr. Chandran noted Weaver had seen numerous providers including pulmonology, reflux specialists, and ear, nose, and throat doctors.  Yet, the true source of his cough had not been determined.  He characterized National Jewish Health as a leading center for evaluation and management of airway reactive disorders.  As such, it could provide a multispecialty approach in a comprehensive setting with intensive daily therapy.  Dr. Chandran stated only National Jewish Health has the capability to provide this quality and intensity of care.  

          Dr. Bruce Broudy reviewed Weaver’s medical records at UPS’ request.  In an August 30, 2016 report, Dr. Broudy stated referral to the Denver facility for a second opinion was reasonable but not necessary.  He opined other facilities in Louisville that specialize in pulmonary and ear, nose and throat treatment could provide a second opinion. 

          The ALJ found the opinion of Dr. Broudy persuasive and determined the referral to National Jewish Health was reasonable but not necessary because there are other facilities in Louisville that can provide a second opinion.  Accordingly, the ALJ determined the referral was non-compensable. 

          Weaver filed a petition for reconsideration arguing the finding of reasonableness is sufficient as a matter of law to render the treatment compensable.  The ALJ summarily denied the petition for reconsideration by Order dated January 19, 2017.

          On appeal, Weaver argues the ALJ’s determination that the proposed treatment is reasonable requires a finding of compensability due to language found in the March 27, 2015 Opinion and Award.  The Opinion and Award states:

Plaintiff shall further recover of Defendant/Employer, and/or its insurance carrier, for the cure and relief from the effect of Plaintiff’s workers compensation injury, such medical, surgical and hospital treatment, including nursing, medical and surgical supplies and appliances as may be reasonably required at the time of Plaintiff’s injury and thereafter during disability.

 

          KRS 342.020(1) requires an employer to pay for the cure and relief from the effects of an injury “as may reasonably be required at the time of the injury and thereafter during disability.”  Thus, to be compensable, a medical expense must be both reasonable and necessary.  However, Weaver emphasizes the Opinion and Award referred only to “reasonable” expenses.  Therefore, any “reasonable” treatment is compensable and, because there was no appeal on this issue, it is the law of the case.

          Weaver correctly cites to the language contained on page 22 of the March 27, 2015 Opinion and Award.  However, on page 21, the Opinion and Award also states, “As to future medical expenses, the Plaintiff should be entitled to the cost of reasonable and necessary treatment for the cure and relief of his work related injury. KRS 342.020.”  As such, we disagree that the language of the Opinion and Order supersedes the statute, as Weaver argues. 

          In a post-award medical fee dispute, the employer bears the burden of proving the challenged medical expenses are unreasonable or unnecessary.  Mitee Enterprises vs. Yates, 865 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. 1993); National Pizza Company vs. Curry, 802 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. App. 1991).  Since UPS was successful before the ALJ in demonstrating the proposed referral was unnecessary, the issue on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion.  Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641 (Ky. 1986).  Substantial evidence has been defined as evidence of substance and relevant consequence, having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people.  Smyzer v. B. F. Goodrich Chemical Co., 474 S.W.2d 367 (Ky. 1971).  Although an opposing party may note evidence that would have supported a conclusion contrary to the ALJ’s decision, such evidence is not an adequate basis for reversal on appeal.  McCloud v. Beth-Elkhorn Corp., 514 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1974).   

          In the case sub judice, the medical experts agreed the referral for a second opinion was reasonable.  However, the ALJ was presented with conflicting medical opinions as to the necessity of a referral to the facility in Denver, Colorado.  Dr. Broudy stated providers in the Louisville area were capable of providing a second opinion.  Dr. Broudy’s opinion constitutes the requisite proof to support the ALJ’s finding that the referral is not necessary.  The ALJ acted within his discretion to determine which evidence to rely upon, and it cannot be said the ALJ’s conclusions are so unreasonable as to compel a different result.  Ira A. Watson Department Store v. Hamilton, 34 S.W.3d 48 (Ky. 2000).  Because the ALJ’s determination is supported by the record, we are without authority to disturb his decision on appeal. Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641 (Ky. 1986).

          Accordingly, the November 21, 2016 Opinion and Order and the January 19, 2017 Order rendered by Hon. Jonathan R. Weatherby, Administrative Law Judge, are hereby AFFIRMED.

          ALL CONCUR.

 

 

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER:

 

HON WAYNE C DAUB

600 W MAIN ST #300

LOUISVILLE, KY 40202

 

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT:

 

HON K LANCE LUCAS

HON SARAH C ROGERS

1511 CAVALRY LN #201

FLORENCE, KY 41042

 

MEDICAL PROVIDER:

 

SWAPNA CHANDRAN, MD

401 E CHESTNUT ST #710

LOUISVILLE, KY 40202

 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:

 

HON JONATHAN WEATHERBY

PREVENTION PARK

657 CHAMBERLIN AVENUE

FRANKFORT, KY 40601