*/
Workers’
Compensation Board
OPINION
ENTERED: January 6, 2017
CLAIM NO. 201360631
GULF COAST ENTERPRISES PETITIONER/
CROSS-RESPONDENT
VS. APPEAL FROM HON. STEVEN G. BOLTON,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
ROBERT RAY REED RESPONDENT/
and CROSS-PETITIONER
HON. STEVEN G. BOLTON,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE RESPONDENT
OPINION
AFFIRMING
IN PART,
VACATING
IN PART & REMANDING
*
* * * * *
BEFORE: ALVEY, Chairman, STIVERS and RECHTER, Members.
ALVEY,
Chairman. Gulf Coast Enterprises (“Gulf Coast”) seeks review of the Opinion, Award
and Order rendered March 21, 2016 by Hon. Steven G. Bolton, Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) awarding Robert Ray Reed (“Reed”) temporary total disability
(“TTD”) benefits, permanent partial disability (“PPD”) benefits enhanced
pursuant to KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 and medical benefits for a work-related right
ankle injury which occurred on November 12, 2013. Gulf Coast additionally appeals from the May
5, 2016 order denying its petition for reconsideration.
Reed filed a
cross-appeal seeking review of the ALJ’s determination. Reed did not file a petition for
reconsideration.
On appeal, Gulf Coast
argues the ALJ’s enhancement of the award of PPD benefits pursuant to KRS
342.730(1)(c)1 is clearly erroneous and not supported by the evidence, in
particular the testimony of Dr. George E. Quill, Jr. Reed argues the ALJ erred in failing to find
him permanently totally disabled due to his work-related injury. Because the ALJ’s decision finding Reed
permanently partially disabled is supported by substantial evidence, is in
accordance with existing law, and a contrary result is not compelled, we affirm
in part. However, we vacate in part and
remand for an additional determination regarding the application of KRS
342.730(1)(c)1.
Reed filed a Form 101 on
August 6, 2014, alleging he sustained injuries to his right ankle, elbow and
wrist when he slipped while operating a weed eater on a slope at Ft. Knox,
Kentucky. Reed was working for Gulf
Coast through a job placement program for disabled veterans. His work history includes working as a truck
driver, dump truck driver, maintenance worker, mixing syrup for Pepsi, and a fireman
in the U.S. Coast Guard.
Reed testified by
deposition on October 1, 2014, and again at the hearing held January 26,
2016. Reed was born on August 18, 1965,
and resides in Vine Grove, Hardin County, Kentucky. He is a high school graduate and completed
one year of college coursework. He also
had a Commercial Driver’s License at the time of the accident. He no longer has that license because he
cannot pass the physical examination.
Reed was employed by
Gulf Coast as a general maintenance worker. Gulf Coast provided maintenance activities for
Ft. Knox. In his capacity as a maintenance
worker, Reed drove dump trucks, tanker trucks, spreader trucks and snow
plows. He also performed ground
maintenance activities including tree removal, branch trimming, carrying bushes
to wood chippers, stump grinding, and moving barrels for special events. He was required to stand for prolonged
periods of time, walk, climb ladders and stairs, lift in excess of fifty
pounds, rake leaves, and vacuum parking lots.
Reed testified he had
never previously experienced right elbow problems. He admitted he had a prior right ankle
problem which had resolved, and he was not experiencing any ongoing difficulty
at the time of the accident.
Reed injured his right
knee while moving equipment on a Coast Guard Cutter while serving in the U.S.
Coast Guard. He has continued to have
problems with his knee due to his service connected injury, and receives
disability benefits for this condition.
On the date of the
accident, Reed was weed-eating and cutting saplings on Bullion Boulevard at Ft.
Knox. He was standing on a very steep
slope when his feet slipped, causing his right ankle to roll to the
inside. He also claimed he injured his
right wrist and elbow.
Reed sought treatment at
the Veteran’s Administration clinic in Louisville. There he was advised he had broken his right
ankle. He was placed in a boot and taken
off work. One physician suggested he
undergo ankle fusion surgery. Reed is
leery of having any surgery due to a previous bad surgical experience. Reed stated he treats for unrelated
psychological conditions including depression and anxiety, but has not asserted
those have anything to do with the injuries he sustained in the work-related
fall. He also stated he receives VA
benefits for a service connected disability due to post-traumatic stress
disorder, his right knee and hearing loss.
He uses a cane which he stated was given to him at the VA clinic. He also wears right ankle and wrist
braces. He continues to take medication
for his work injuries, and has not returned to work since the date of the
accident. He does not believe he can
return to work for Gulf Coast due to his physical limitations.
In support of his
claim, Reed filed the March 26, 2014 report of Dr. Andrew DeGruccio, which was
also later filed by Gulf Coast. Dr.
DeGruccio stated Reed’s condition was difficult to assess. He noted no substantial swelling on physical
examination. He found Reed had a grade I
lateral ankle sprain. He noted Reed had a
pre-existing osteochondral dissecans lesion of the central talar dome which
appeared to be stable and unrelated to current pain reporting. He recommended physical therapy and an
injection. He did not believe Reed had
reached maximum medical improvement (“MMI”).
Dr. DeGruccio also stated, based upon the radiology report, the defect
was not acute and not likely specifically related to the work injury.
In a supplemental
report dated July 3, 2014, filed by Gulf Coast, Dr. DeGruccio again stated the
case is very complicated. He
additionally stated Reed had reached MMI because he rejected the recommended
treatment options. He stated Reed would
have no impairment, and he would not impose any restrictions.
Dr. DeGruccio testified
by deposition on December 9, 2014. He
noted Reed exhibited some degree of symptom magnification and exaggeration on
examination. Despite Reed’s complaints,
he could move his right ankle normally.
He stated Reed’s ability to walk was inconsistent with his report of
injury. Dr. DeGruccio had previously
recommended a cortisone injection. He
also noted Reed may need arthroscopic surgery to visualize the talus and
defect, but this was not directly related to the alleged injury. He stated Dr. Quill’s recommendation of a
brace to be used while traversing uneven ground was reasonable. Dr. DeGruccio stated Reed would have no
impairment rating for his right ankle.
He also stated Reed needs no assistive devices for his right ankle. He did not believe Reed’s complaints were due
to the arousal of a pre-existing dormant condition into disabling reality.
Reed filed the records
from Dr. Todd Hockenbury. On February
24, 2014, Dr. Hockenbury recommended surgery for Reed’s right talar
osteochondritis dissecans lesion.
Dr. Robert Byrd examined
Reed on October 23, 2014. He diagnosed
an osteochondral defect of the central dome of the talus. He stated this was a dormant condition
aggravated by his work injury on November 12, 2013. Dr. Byrd noted Reed walked with an antalgic
gate and used an assistive device. He
diagnosed a right ankle sprain. Dr. Byrd
assessed a 15% impairment rating pursuant to the American Medical Association, Guides
to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 5th Edition (“AMA Guides”)
for the right ankle condition. He opined
the pain Reed experienced in his wrist and arm was unrelated to his work
injury.
Gulf Coast filed the
August 12, 2014 report of Dr. Quill, an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Quill stated Reed was a 48 year old heavy
set gentleman who complained of right ankle pain due to a November 12, 2013
work injury. He noted Reed rolled his
right ankle while using a weed- eater.
He noted Reed’s previous service related disability due to the right
knee. He additionally noted Reed was
working for Gulf Coast through a program for disabled veterans. Regarding a diagnosis, Dr. Quill stated,
“This gentleman has a chronic appearing lesion of the central dome of his talus
sustained during a work-related right ankle sprain.” He additionally stated, “It may be that his
work-related November of 2013 injury brought into some small way a disabling
reality of a preexisting condition.” Dr.
Quill saw no need for surgery and recommended a brace or arthrosis for the
right ankle.
Dr. Quill testified by
deposition on October 9, 2014. He saw
Reed on July 1, 2014 and again on August 20, 2014 for evaluation of the need
for ankle fusion surgery. He stated the
right ankle abnormalities revealed on imaging studies were old, and nothing
indicated he had a recent injury. He
again stated the work event may have exacerbated his underlying condition. Dr. Quill saw no indication for the need for
surgery. He recommended no restrictions
except for symptomatic support for the ankle on uneven ground, which is why he
recommended a custom brace. Dr. Quill
also stated if high top lace up boots provides relief, he does not need the
brace. Dr. Quill assessed a 3% impairment
rating pursuant to the AMA Guides.
He additionally stated Reed had reached MMI when he saw him on August
20, 2014. Dr. Quill specifically noted
Reed’s injury was “somewhat trivial” and his discomfort could be treated with
Ibuprofen or Aleve.
Gulf Coast filed 206
pages of medical records from the VA Medical Center for treatment received by
Reed from October 15, 2000 through May 2, 2014.
Most of those records pertain to conditions unrelated to Reed’s work
injury, and are irrelevant. The first
note of right ankle complaints was on November 12, 2013 indicating he sustained
an osteochondral injury to the central talar.
The note from December 11, 2013 states Reed was to be off work
indefinitely. The March 18, 2014 note
indicated Reed needed a consult for a possible ankle fusion. On May 7, 2014, Reed indicated he wished to
hold off on having any surgery.
Gulf Coast also filed
records from the Department of Veteran’s Affairs. On March 3, 2014, there was a determination
that his right ankle condition was unrelated to his right knee.
A Benefit Review
Conference was held on January 13, 2015.
It was noted Reed sustained a work-related injury on November 12,
2013. The issues included whether he
retained the capacity to return to the job performed on the date of injury;
benefits per KRS 342.730; unpaid or contested medical expenses; TTD; vocational
rehabilitation; exclusion for pre-existing active disability/impairment; extent
and duration of disability with multipliers; PPD; and permanent total
disability. These issues were reiterated
in the hearing order dated January 26, 2016.
The ALJ rendered a
decision on March 2, 2016. He found Reed
had sustained a work-related injury to the right ankle on November 12,
2013. He dismissed the claims for the
right wrist and elbow injuries. The ALJ
awarded PPD benefits based upon the 3% impairment rating assessed by Dr. Quill,
enhanced by the three-multiplier pursuant to KRS 342.730(1)(c)1. The ALJ also awarded medical benefits
pursuant to KRS 342.020.
The ALJ specifically
found as follows:
The brace which Dr. Byrd
cites to support his WPI rating was actually fitted, constructed and provided
by Dr. Quill as a proposed aid to help Mr. Reed work on uneven ground, not rely
upon 24/7. Instead of utilizing that aid
to his advantage, Mr. Reed completed rejected it. As I have such much difficulty separating
fact from fiction in Mr. Reed’s testimony and argument, I rely primarily on the
medical evidence in the record.
I believe from the
evidence taken as a whole that Mr. Reed did suffer a minor work injury on
November 12, 2013, but I also believe that the ankle sprain was relatively
minor. I believe that the real cause of
Mr. Reed’s distress is the chronic-appearing osteochondral lesion of the
central dome of his talus sustained during a work-related right ankle
sprain. In making that finding, I rely
on the medical opinion of Dr. George E. Quill, Jr., M.D., which I find to be
the most complete, comprehensive and compelling medical evidence in the record
as it relates to the claimed ankle injury suffered by Mr. Reed and its
consequences.
As Dr. Quill
opined, Mr. Reed’s work-related injury of 11/12/2013 brought into disabling
reality a dormant, previously unknown, and inactive preexisting condition. Dr. Quill’s [sic] had made him a protective
custom articulated ankle-foot orthosis. Thereafter, Dr. Quill would not place
any restrictions upon him other than wearing it while he is up and around and
working. Dr. Quill released Mr. Reed to
return to work on 07/02/2014 with restrictions of sedentary work until his
brace was made.
Dr. Quill later
assigned to the plaintiff a 3% WPI rating.
He found him to be at MMI as of August 20, 2014.
Dr. DeGruccio found
no disability in Mr. Reed as the result of the 11/12/2013 work accident, and
therefore assigned no restrictions.
Dr. Byrd, whose
opinion I have found not to be persuasive, assigned plaintiff a 15% WPI. Both Dr. Quill and Dr. DeGruccio found that
to be excessive and commented on Dr,[sic] Byrd’s reliance on Table 17-5, page
529 of the AMA Guides. As noted, Table 17-5 rates Lower Limb
Impairment Due to Gait Derangement. As
noted, Mr. Reed also suffers from right knee problems, plantar fasciitis and
low back pain, all of which can contribute to, and cause, gait
derangement. For that reason, I do not
believe that Dr. Byrd’s rating is as accurate or as soundly base medically, as
Dr. Quill’s.
Further, even if
Table 17-5 were applicable, an award of 15% under the pertinent portion of that
table would require a finding of routine use of an assistive device,
which was not ordered by any of the evaluating physicians. I rely on the opinions of the evaluating
physicians because Mr. Reed suffers from so many varied conditions for which he
receives treatment at the VA, it is difficult at times to discern from the VA
medical records the condition for which he is actually being treated.
Plaintiff urges a
finding of permanent total disability, citing in support the medical opinion of
Dr. Robert W. Byrd, M.D., which I have already found to be non-persuasive.
As the Plaintiff
accurately notes, determination of whether a Plaintiff is permanent totally
disabled under KRS 342.0011(11)(c) requires an individualized determination of
what the work is and is not able to do after recovering from the work
injury. Ira A. Watson Department Store v. Hamilton, 34 S.W.3d 51
(Ky. 2000). The ALJ must consider
factors such as a worker’s post-injury physical, emotional, intellectual, and
vocational status and how those factors interact. Id. Additionally, consideration must be given to
the likelihood that the worker would be able to find work consistently under
normal employment conditions. Id.
Here, however, I do
not find the medical restrictions assigned by Dr. Byrd to be persuasive. Dr. DeGruccio found the plaintiff to have no
disability, while Dr. Quill found him to have some disability. Dr. Quill opined that he would have no
restrictions if he would wear the protective ankle support created for him by
Dr. Quill when he worked on uneven ground.
Thus, the medical evidence that I find to be persuasive confirms only
that the Plaintiff is under medical restrictions/limitations only to the extent
that he followed Dr. Quill’s medical advice.
And, even if he didn’t there is no persuasive medical evidence in my
opinion that he is totally unable to function because of his 11/12/2013 ankle
injury. He has a lot of other unrelated
medical/ psychological problems that might prohibit his employment, but under
our law, I cannot consider them.
The Plaintiff argues
that he has been unable to return to any of his work activities since the
occurrence of the stipulated injury, and that he has not been able to search
for alternative employment as he lacks the skills to obtain a sedentary
position, and he is unable to complete physically demanding work given his
restrictions and limitations. Yet, the
only effort reflected in the record before me is the Plaintiff’s attempt to
increase his disability payments. I am
not being critical of that effort, but I see no serious attempt to return to
any type of gainful employment, even through the program in which he was
previously participating that places disabled veterans.
I see no
compensable condition arising from this injury that prohibits the Plaintiff
from searching for and finding gainful employment. He has a high school diploma and work
skills. There is no substantial evidence
in the record that he is disabled from all employment.
FINDINGS
OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon a review
of all of the evidence contained in the record and summarized above, the ALJ
does hereby make the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
1. The stipulations made and entered into by and
between the parties at the Benefit Review Conference on January 13, 2015 are
hereby approved and incorporated herein by reference as findings of fact.
2. The findings of fact and conclusions of law
set out in the foregoing Analysis are hereby incorporated herein by reference,
the same as if set out in words and letters.
3. The Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden
of proof that he suffered a work-related injury on November 12, 2013 when he
allegedly hurt his right wrist and elbow when he fell while working for the
Defendant Employer. KRS 342.0011. Snawder
v. Stice, 576 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. App. 1978).
In making this finding, I rely on the medical opinion of Dr. Robert W.
Byrd, M.D., which I find to be persuasive.
4. I find from the evidence taken as a whole
that the Plaintiff did suffer a work injury on November 12, 2013 that arose out
of, or in the course of his employment with the Defendant Employer, when he
“rolled his ankle” on an incline, thereby sustaining a minor ankle strain, but
also arousing into disabling reality a previously existing, dormant and
non-disabling osteochondral lesion of the central dome of his talus. In making that finding, I rely on the medical
opinion of Dr. George E. Quill, Jr., M.D., which I find to be the most
complete, comprehensive and compelling medical evidence in the record as it
relates to the claimed ankle injury suffered by Mr. Reed and its consequences,
and by which I am persuaded.
5. As the direct and proximate result of that
injury, I find the Plaintiff to have a whole person impairment (WPI) of 3%
calculated according to the AMA Guides to
the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 5th Edition. In making that finding, I rely on the medical
opinion of Dr. George E. Quill, Jr., M.D.
6. Dr. Quill designed and had made for the
Plaintiff an ankle brace designed to be worn when he was working on uneven
ground. The Plaintiff complained about
the brace and would not wear it. He said
he couldn’t wear it. Nevertheless, even
with the brace, I do not believe that the Plaintiff could return to the same
job he was performing at the time of his injury. I base that on the medical opinion of Dr.
Quill, who apparently is of the opinion that he should not try to do grass or
weed cutting on steep inclines. As the
brace was never successfully utilized, we have no way of knowing if it would
work. For that reason, I do think that
the Plaintiff is entitled to a “3 multiplier” pursuant to KRS
342.730(1)(c)1.
7. Based upon the foregoing, I find that
pursuant to KRS 342.730, the Plaintiff is entitled to a weekly award of
permanent partial benefits calculated as follows: $812.47 AWW x 2/3 = $541.65 x
1.95% Permanent Disability Rating = $10.56 x 3 statutory multiplier = $31.69.
8. The parties have stipulated that the
Defendant voluntarily paid TTD benefits from 11/12/13 until 7/8/14 at a weekly
rate of $519.17. The Plaintiff
acknowledges that the Defendant is entitled to a credit for the voluntary TTD
payments. However, based on a stipulated
average weekly wage of $812.47, the Plaintiff should have received a weekly
benefit amount of $541.65. Dr. Quill, upon
whose opinion I have relied, placed the Plaintiff at MMI on August 20,
2014. Therefore, pursuant to KRS
342.730(1)(a), the Plaintiff is entitled to an award of TTD benefits from
November 13, 2013 through August 20, 2014 at the weekly rate of $541.65.
9. There is an issue as to unpaid or contested medical expenses. There is no evidence in the record to
indicate that any treatment received for Plaintiff’s right ankle was
unnecessary or unreasonable. I am not
aware that there were any medical expenses incurred for the treatment of
Plaintiff’s right wrist, or right elbow.
Regardless, it appears that all medical expenses were borne by the VA,
which could conceivably have some type of action available to it for reimbursement. As the overwhelming weight of the lay and
medical evidence indicates that all medical treatment provided for the right
ankle, right wrist, and right elbow has been reasonable and within medically
necessity, the Plaintiff is entitled to the related past, present, and future
medical benefits pursuant to KRS 342.020 and Cavin v. Lake Construction Co, 451 S.W.2d 159 (1970).
10. Given his plethora of other medical problems
unrelated to this work-related injury, I do not find that at the present time
the Plaintiff is a good candidate for vocational rehabilitation. KRS 342.190.
Gulf Coast filed a
petition for reconsideration arguing because the ALJ relied upon Dr. Quill who
provided no support for enhancing the award of benefits pursuant to KRS 342.730
(1)(c)1, such finding was patently erroneous.
Reed filed no petition for reconsideration, but objected to the petition
filed by Gulf Coast. The ALJ denied the
petition for reconsideration in an order dated May 5, 2016.
We first note it is
undisputed that Reed sustained a work-related right ankle injury while working
for Gulf Coast. We next note, as the
claimant in a workers’ compensation proceeding, Reed had the burden of proving
each of the essential elements of his cause of action. See
KRS 342.0011(1); Snawder v. Stice, 576 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. App. 1979). Since Reed was successful in establishing he
sustained a work-related injury and was entitled to TTD benefits as well as PPD
benefits enhanced pursuant to the multipliers contained in KRS 342.730(1)(c)1,
the question on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
decision. Wolf Creek Collieries v.
Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735 (Ky. App. 1984).
“Substantial evidence” is defined as evidence of
relevant consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of
reasonable persons. Smyzer v. B. F.
Goodrich Chemical Co., 474 S.W.2d 367 (Ky. 1971).
Regarding Reed’s argument of entitlement to an award of
permanent total disability benefits, the question on appeal is whether the
evidence is so overwhelming it compels a finding in his favor. Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, supra.
“Compelling evidence” is defined as evidence so overwhelming
no reasonable person could reach the same conclusion as the ALJ. REO Mechanical v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d
224 (Ky. App. 1985). As fact-finder, the
ALJ has the sole authority to determine the quality, character, and substance
of the evidence. Square D Company v.
Tipton, 862 S.W.2d 308 (Ky. 1993); Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt,
695 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1985). Similarly,
the ALJ has the sole authority to judge the weight and inferences to be drawn
from the evidence. Miller v. East Kentucky Beverage/ Pepsico, Inc., 951
S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1997); Luttrell v. Cardinal
Aluminum Co., 909 S.W.2d 334 (Ky. App.
1995). Where the evidence is conflicting, the ALJ may choose whom or what
to believe. Pruitt v. Bugg Brothers,
547 S.W.2d 123 (Ky. 1977). The ALJ has
the discretion and sole authority to reject any testimony and believe or
disbelieve parts of the evidence, regardless of whether it comes from the same
witness or the same party’s total proof. Caudill v. Maloney's Discount
Stores, 560 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1977); Magic Coal v. Fox, 19 S.W.3d 88
(Ky. 2000); Halls Hardwood Floor Co. v. Stapleton, 16 S.W.3d 327 (Ky. App. 2000). Mere evidence contrary to the ALJ’s decision
is not adequate to require reversal on appeal.
Whittaker v. Rowland, 998 S.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1999). McCloud v. Beth-Elkhorn Corp., 514 S.W.2d 46 (Ky.
1974).
The function of the Board in reviewing
an ALJ’s decision is limited to determining whether the findings made are so
unreasonable under the evidence they must be reversed as a matter of law. Ira A. Watson Department Store v. Hamilton,
34 S.W.3d 48 (Ky. 2000). The Board, as
an appellate tribunal, may not usurp the ALJ's role as fact-finder by
superimposing its own appraisals as to weight and credibility or by noting
other conclusions or reasonable inferences that otherwise could have been drawn
from the evidence. So long as the ALJ’s
ruling with regard to an issue is supported by substantial evidence, it may not
be disturbed on appeal. Special
Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986).
Here, the ALJ clearly found Dr.
Quill’s opinions constitute the most credible evidence in this case. He explained his reasoning for relying on Dr.
Quill’s opinions rather than those of the other medical providers. It was within his discretion to do so. While evidence exists to support a contrary
conclusion, in particular the opinions of Dr. Byrd, this merely constitutes
evidence upon which the ALJ could have relied, but chose not to. This does not compel a contrary result, and the
ALJ’s determination Reed is not permanently totally disabled will not be
disturbed.
That said, the ALJ
specifically stated Dr. Quill opined Reed, “should not try to do grass or weed
cutting on steep inclines.” A review of
Dr. Quill’s office notes and deposition fails to reveal this admonition. In fact, Dr. Quill clearly stated he would
impose no restrictions on Reed’s activities.
Although the ALJ explained why he applied the three-multiplier contained
in KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 in enhancing the award of PPD benefits, this does not
appear to be supported by the record. We
are therefore compelled to vacate the ALJ’s application of KRS
342.730(1)(c)1.
On remand, the ALJ must
point to the specific portions of Dr. Quill’s notes or deposition which support
his determination. If the evidence does
not exist, the three-multiplier cannot be applied. We make no finding in this regard and the ALJ
is free to make any determination which is supported by the record.
Accordingly, the Opinion,
Award and Order rendered March 21, 2016 and the May 5, 2016 order on
reconsideration by Hon. Steven G. Bolton, Administrative Law Judge, are hereby AFFIRMED IN PART and VACATED IN PART, and REMANDED consistent with the direction
set forth above.
ALL
CONCUR.
COUNSEL
FOR PETITIONER GULF COAST ENTERPRISES:
HON JO ALICE VAN NAGELL
300 EAST MAIN ST, STE 400
LEXINGTON, KY 40507
COUNSEL
FOR RESPONDENT ROBERT RAY REED:
HON CHED JENNINGS
401 WEST MAIN ST, STE 1910
LOUISVILLE, KY 40202
CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE:
HON ROBERT L SWISHER
PREVENTION PARK
657 CHAMBERLIN AVENUE
FRANKFORT, KY 40601
